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The European Union (EU) instituted a carding system via its European Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 with the goal of incentivizing fish and fish products (fish)
exporting countries to the Union to take action to reduce IUU fishing in their waters.
This regulation stipulates that the EU will issue warnings, known as a “yellow card,” to
countries that perform poorly in the effort to end IUU fishing in their waters. Failure to
curb IUU fishing will result in a ban in the export of fish to the EU via the issuance of
a red card. Here, I ask the following questions: what is the economic risk of being red
carded by the EU? Is the economic risk big enough to significantly reduce IUU fishing
in a targeted country’s waters? Would the risk be broad enough to result in a significant
reduction in IUU fishing globally? What if the two other leading fish importing countries,
i.e., the United States and Japan, also institute a similar carding system as the EU? To
address these questions, I develop and compute an economic risk index for the carding
system. This study suggests that the impact of an EU only IUU carding system could be
significant for some targeted countries but its effect globally, with respect to reducing
IUU fishing, would be minimal. However, I find that the economic risk to fish exporting
countries would increase significantly if the United States and Japan also instituted
similar carding systems, which would in turn help to reduce IUU fishing worldwide.
This contribution shows that an IUU carding system could contribute significantly to
the elimination of IUU fishing provided a critical mass of top fish importing countries
participate in such a system.
Keywords: IUU fishing, economic indicators, economic risk index, EU, United States, Japan
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the benefits from IUU fishing by drying up the market for IUU
caught fish exported to EU countries. This regulation stipulates
that the EU will issue warnings, known as a “yellow card,” to
countries whose waters are judged to be prone to IUU fishing
(European Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008, Articles
23 and 241 ). The goal is to incentivize countries to take action to
reduce IUU fishing in their waters.
The regulation sets terms and conditions for third parties
via a certification scheme which issues yellow, and ultimately,
red cards that prohibit the export of IUU caught fish in EU
markets (European Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008,
Articles 4 and 242 ). The regulation sets an assessment scheme for
port inspection. It also introduces a community alert system and
sanction measures (Papaioannou, 2016). The introduction of the
carding system has seen yellow and red cards applied to a range
of countries (e.g., Belize, Fiji, Guinea, Sri Lanka, Togo, Viet Nam,
Thailand, Ghana), with some (e.g., Belize, Fiji, Togo) delisted
after meeting requirements for strong controls over fisheries and
others upgraded from yellow to red for failing to address issues.
Countries such as Cambodia, Guinea, and Sri Lanka failed to
meet the requirements and therefore remain red listed1 .
It is worth noting that this is not the first time that the EU has
used its market power with respect to bans on fish. In 1997, the
EU banned shrimp imports from Bangladesh and demanded the
introduction and enforcement of HACCP compliance systems
in processing plants exporting shrimp to the markets of its
member countries.
Here, I create a simple Carding Economic Risk Index (C-ERI)
and apply it to determine the economic risk of being red carded
by the EU. I first quantify the potential economic risk facing fish
exporting countries to the EU should they be red carded, and
therefore lose access to EU’s fish markets. The analysis is then
extended to include those of the United States and Japan. The
goal is to find out the extent to which the implementation of a
similar red carding system by these two important fish markets
would strengthen the efficacy of such a system with respect to
combatting IUU fishing. These three markets constitute a large
proportion of the global fish import-export market (Swartz et al.,
2010), importing fish of an estimated average annual value of
USD 58 billion between 2010 and 2014. Hence, together they are
in a position to exert significant market influence.

HIGHLIGHTS
- A carding system can incentivize fishers to avoid IUU fishing.
- An EU only IUU carding system can incentivize targeted
countries to curb IUU fishing in their waters.
- An EU only IUU carding system is limited in its ability to
prevent, deter and stop IUU fishing worldwide.
- Carding systems by the United States, Japan and EU would
increase the worldwide effect of the system in stopping
IUU fishing.

INTRODUCTION
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a significant
problem facing fisheries worldwide (Sumaila et al., 2006; Agnew
et al., 2009), with a significant impact on sustainability of
fish stocks and the economic and social benefits derived from
fisheries (Charles et al., 1999; Sumaila et al., 2006). Thus, several
measures have been proposed to tackle IUU fishing (OECD,
2004; Österblom et al., 2015) many of which are derived from
the basic economic insight that people engage in IUU fishing
because it pays economically to do so (Becker, 1995; Kuperan
and Sutinen, 1998; OECD, 2004; Miller et al., 2016). IUU fishing
can be reduced (possibly to zero) by doing one or both of the
following: (i) decreasing the gross benefits enjoyed by IUU fishers
from engaging in this activity; (ii) increasing the cost of doing so.
Increasing the cost of engaging in IUU fishing can be achieved by
increasing the probability of being apprehended fishing illegally
and/or by imposing a significant penalty when caught fishing
illegally (OECD, 2004; Sumaila et al., 2004).
To increase the likelihood of being apprehended while
engaging in IUU fishing, monitoring control and surveillance
(MCS) systems in maritime countries need to be strengthened
and made more effective, especially in many developing
countries. This is because current MCS systems are not in good
shape as evidenced by the high levels of IUU fishing taking place
in many parts of the global ocean. It is the recognition of the
limits of on water control of destructive overfishing that has
increased interest in using market-based instruments to provide
solutions to what is essentially cases of regulatory failure.
Looking to the market to address IUU fishing ‘flips’ traditional
MCS models (where monitoring and control occurs at sea) to
a focus on the post-harvest supply chain. Market approaches
recognize that products eventually enter the market because
fishing is an economic activity where the return from the catch is
a critical element in the viability of the activity. The development
of catch documentation systems introduced by management
organizations and non-state based “third party” certification of
fisheries are direct responses to the concerns over unregulated
fishing, and are now more common and embedded tools at the
fishery or stock level.
European Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 was
adopted on September 29, 2008 and entered into force on
January 1, 2010 (European Commission, 2008). This regulation
establishes a Community-wide system to prevent, deter, and
eliminate IUU fishing. It is a market approach that seeks to reduce
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Fish Export Dependency Indicators
The EU carding system is not relevant to countries that do not
export fish to its member countries. In other words, the carding
system is less relevant the less the amount of fish a country
exports to the EU market and vice versa. To capture the extent of
dependency on the EU market, I created three simple indicators:

1

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2012.354.
01.0001.01.ENG
2
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.091.01.
0043.01.ENG
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An exporting country with Fish2Fish = Fish2Products =
Fish2GDP = 1 is completely dependent on the EU market for its
export earnings. On the other hand, a country with zero scores for
all three indicators has zero dependency on the EU fish market.
Note that the ratios above work similarly if we replace the EU
with the United States and Japan separately or jointly with the EU
in a scenario in which all three countries are assumed to have in
place a carding system.

(1) The ratio of the value of exported fish to the EU relative to
fish exported by the exporting country worldwide (denoted:
Fish2Fish ratio);
(2) The ratio of the value of exported fish to the EU relative
to the total export of all products by the exporting country
worldwide (denoted: Fish2Products ratio);
(3) The proportion of the value of exported fish to the EU to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the exporting country
(denoted: Fish2GDP ratio).

A Carding Economic Risk Index

The higher the Fish2Fish ratio for a country exporting fish
to the EU the stronger its dependence on the EU market since
this implies that most of the country’s fish export goes to the
EU. A high Fish2Products ratio for a country exporting fish to
the EU implies an even stronger dependence on exports to EU
member countries than a similarly high Fish2Fish ratio because
this means that fish is a major portion of the country’s total
product exports. Finally, a high Fish2GDP ratio for a country
exporting fish to the EU is an indication of an even stronger
dependence on EU markets because fish is a major part of the
country’s GDP.

I bring the three ratios presented above together to create a
carding risk index (C-ERI). I assume that the economic risk
facing an exporting country depends on how high the Fish2Fish,
Fish2Products and Fish2GDP ratios are, and proceed to develop
an economic risk index made up of a weighted sum of the
computed values of the three ratios as follows:
Economicriskindex = w∗1 Fish2Fish + w∗2 Fish2Products+
w∗3 Fish2GDP

TABLE 1 | Fish exports to the EU, the United States and Japan.
Political entity

Imports (million tons)

Imports ( billion USD)

Top 20 exporting countries

All exporting countries

Top 20 exporting countries

All exporting countries

EU

4.4

5.2

21.4

26.1

United States

1.1

1.2

15.7

17.6

Japan

1.1

1.2

14.1

15.6

TABLE 2 | Top 20 Fish exporting countries to the EU, the United States and Japan.
EU top 20 countries

Export value
to EU (million
USD)

US top 20 countries

Export value
to
United States
(million USD)

Japan top 20 countries

Export value
to Japan
(million USD)

Norway

5,800

China

2,710

China

2,850

China

2,100

Canada

2,580

Chile

1,400

Iceland

1,290

Thailand

2,010

Thailand

1,360

Ecuador

1,230

Indonesia

1,350

United States

1,360

Morocco

1,180

Viet Nam

1,210

Russia

1,300

Viet Nam

1,160

Chile

1,170

Viet Nam

910

United States

1,160

Ecuador

880

Norway

850

Thailand

1,050

India

840

Indonesia

840

Indonesia

880

Mexico

510

South Korea

800

Argentina

770

Norway

380

Canada

450

Peru

710

Philippines

340

India

420

Faroe Islands

670

Russia

280

Australia

260

Chile

580

Japan

280

Philippines

210

Canada

510

Peru

230

Peru

200

Russia

470

Honduras

180

Hong Kong

160

Greenland

440

Malaysia

180

Mauritania

150

India

390

Taiwan

150

New Zealand

140

Turkey

370

United Kingdom

140

Argentina

140

Bangladesh

370

South Korea

130

Morocco

130

Namibia

330

Iceland

130

Iceland

120
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where w1 , w2 and w3 are weights assigned to each ratio,
respectively, which are given the values of 1, 2, 3, respectively,
because of the assumed relative dependence of the exporting
country on the EU market depicted by each of these ratios.

The justification for assigning these weights flows from the
explanation of relative dependence of a country to the EU fish
market depicted by the three different indicators described in
Section “Fish Export Dependency Indicators.”

TABLE 3 | Top Fish2Fish ratio∗ of fish exporting countries to the EU only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined.
EU only Country
French∗∗∗

Southern Territories

Fish2Fish ratio

Export (tons)

EU, United States, Japan Country

Fish2Fish ratio

Export (tons)

0.999

617

French Southern Territories

0.999

617

Macedonia

0.956

1,226

Palau

0.989

650

Cote d’Ivoire

0.921

32,569

Turks and Caicos Islands

0.972

132

Mozambique

0.880

4,845

Macedonia∗∗

0.956

1,226

Seychelles

0.877

52,631

Cote d’Ivoire

0.921

32,569

Falkland Islands

0.854

57,388

Saint Helena

0.915

415

Madagascar

0.836

20,253

Mozambique

0.880

4,845

Kazakhstan

0.827

7,164

Seychelles

0.877

52,631

Ghana

0.817

32,802

Falkland Islands

0.854

57,388

Christmas Island

0.813

1

Ethiopia

0.853

27

Mauritius

0.810

62,645

Madagascar

0.836

20,253

Albania

0.805

4,050

Kazakhstan

0.827

7,164

Senegal

0.769

39,315

Mauritius

0.820

63,798

Moldova

0.762

44

Cook Isds

0.821

599

Turkey

0.745

58,809

Ghana

0.817

32,802

Morocco

0.739

205,090

Fiji

0.820

4,742

Maldives

0.722

7,604

Christmas Island

0.813

1

Israel

0.717

630

Albania

0.805

4,050

Tunisia

0.709

18,152

Central African Republic

0.800

17

El Salvador

0.695

10,276

Western Sahara

0.800

16

∗ Average

annual value of exported fish for the period 2010–2014 to the EU only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined as a ratio of the value of exported
fish to the world. ∗∗ It should be noted there are a few landlocked countries listed in this table such as Macedonia, implying that freshwater and even farmed fish in included
in the data. ∗∗∗ Islands such as the French Southern territories can hardly be described as independent countries.
TABLE 4 | Top Fish2Products ratio∗ of fish exporting countries to the EU only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined.
EU only Country

Fish2Products ratio

Export (tons)

EU, United States, Japan Country

Fish2Products ratio

Export (tons)

Falkland Islands

0.776

57,388

Palau

0.864

650

Maldives

0.707

7,604

Maldives

0.837

8,426

French Southern T.

0.653

617

Falkland Islands

0.833

57,816

Faroe Islands

0.603

150,921

Greenland

0.706

113,525

Greenland

0.588

109,956

Faroe Island

0.693

154,798

Seychelles

0.584

52,631

Seychelles

0.687

56,080

Mayotte∗∗

0.338

2,383

French Southern T.

0.653

617

Iceland

0.257

223,998

Saint Helena

0.523

415

Cape Verde

0.156

14,486

Cook Isds

0.478

599

Mauritius

0.144

62,645

Mayotte

0.338

2383

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

0.141

239

Iceland

0.309

233,848

Madagascar

0.115

20,253

Tuvalu

0.262

188

Mauritania

0.103

30,819

Western Sahara

0.19

16

Senegal

0.088

39,315

Mauritania

0.186

36,447

Solomon Islands

0.073

4,579

Kiribati

0.163

351

Namibia

0.056

72,179

Micronesia

0.162

342

Morocco

0.056

205,090

Cape Verde

0.156

14,486

Ecuador

0.054

205,324

Mauritius

0.144

62,645

Panama

0.051

23,012

Saint Pierre and Miquelon

0.141

239

Gambia

0.047

930

Grenada

0.137

193

∗ Average

annual value of exported fish for the period 2010–2014 to the EU only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined as a ratio of the value of all
exported products to the world. ∗∗ Islands such as Mayotte can hardly be described as independent countries.
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To illustrate how the index is calculated and what it means,
let’s consider two fish exporting countries, X and Y, with
the following Fish2Fish; Fish2Products; and Fish2GDP ratios,
respectively: (1; 1; 1) and (0; 0; 0). Then country X will
have a total economic risk index of 6, highlighting that it
will face a massive economic risk should it be red carded
by the EU. On the other hand, Country Y will have a total
ratio = 0, implying it will face no economic risk at all if
red carded by the EU. In the real world, all fish exporting
countries to the EU will have economic risk indices that lie
between 0 and 6.
It is worth noting that the suggested formula above for
capturing the economic risk does not take into account an
important element of the EU IUU Regulation, i.e., red carding
also results in a ban on EU vessels fishing in the waters of
the red-carded country. This is significant as some of the
EU Member States are among the countries with the world’s
biggest fishing fleets (e.g., Spain). This additional provision
in the regulation could motivate countries such as Spain to
want to block the red carding of a country in which it has
vested interests.

The amount of fish in weight exported to both Japan and the
United States were obtained from the UNComtrade database
(UN Comtrade, 2016). The value of imported fish to the
United States were retrieved from NOAA Fish Trade Statistics
(NOAA, 2017) but the value of all products exported to the
United States was retrieved from the UNComtrade database. The
UNComtrade database also provided the exported value of fish
products and all products to Japan. To fill data gaps, I calculated
average prices using available quantity of exports in weight and
trade values in USD.
The value of exported products, both for all products
and for only fish, from each exporting country to the entire
world were taken from the UNComtrade database, and are
reported in USD. It should be noted that fish products were
assumed to be encompassed by Harmonized System Codes
03 [The Harmonized System is an international nomenclature
for the classification of products, which allows participating
countries to classify traded goods on a common basis for
customs purposes. At the international level, the Harmonized
System (HS) for classifying goods is a six-digit code system] –
Fish and Crustaceans; 1504 – Fats and oils, their fractions,
fish and marine mammal; 1603 – Extracts, etc. of meat,
fish, crustaceans; 1604 – Prep or pres fish, caviar, and
caviar substitutes; 1604 – Crustaceans molluscs etc. prepared
or preserved; 051191 – Products of fish or crustaceans,
molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; dead animals of
chapter 3; 230120 – Flours, Meals, Pellets of Fish, Crustaceans,
Molluscs (Non-Edible).
It is worth noting that even though the codes listed above
have fish-related headings, not all trade under the listed codes

Fish Exports Data to the EU, the
United States and Japan
The amount of fish exported to the EU both in terms of
weight and value3 were retrieved from the European Commission
Trade Market Access Database (European Commission, 2016).
3

Note that the values were reported in Euros, which I converted into USD using
exchange rate data Canadian Forex (2017).

TABLE 5 | Top Fish2GDP ratio∗ of fish exporting countries to the EU only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined.
EU only Country

Fish2GDP ratio

Export (tons)

EU, United States, Japan Country

Fish2GDP ratio

Export (tons)

Seychelles

0.241

52,631

Seychelles

0.284

56,080

Faroe Islands

0.214

150,921

Faroe Islands

0.244

154,798

Greenland

0.184

109,956

Greenland

0.221

113,525

Iceland

0.087

223,998

Tuvalu

0.128

188

Mauritania

0.040

30,819

Marshall Isds

0.126

860

Maldives

0.034

7,604

Iceland

0.104

233,848

Solomon Islands

0.031

4,579

Palau

0.081

650

Mauritius

0.029

62,645

Mauritania

0.068

36,447

Cape Verde

0.027

14,486

Vanuatu

0.066

1917

Namibia

0.027

72,179

Kiribati

0.058

371

Madagascar

0.016

20,253

Cook Isds

0.055

599

Senegal

0.016

39,315

Maldives

0.04

8,426

Ecuador

0.014

205,324

Solomon Isds

0.037

4,815

Norway

0.012

1,154,944

Fiji

0.032

4,742

Morocco

0.012

205,090

Mauritius

0.029

62,645

Papua New Guinea

0.009

26,765

Micronesia

0.028

342

Nicaragua

0.008

11,493

Cape Verde

0.027

14,486

Vietnam

0.008

304,704

Namibia

0.027

72,179

Belize

0.007

3,366

Ecuador

0.024

238,556

Cote d’Ivoire

0.006

32,569

Belize

0.022

5,195

∗ Average

annual value of exported fish for the period 2010–2014 to the EU only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined as a ratio of the GDP of the
exporting country.
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TABLE 6 | Top high carding economic risk index (C-ERI) fish exporting countries to the EU only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined.
EU only Country

C-ERI

EU, United States, Japan Country

C-ERI

Seychelles

2.768

Palau

3.499

Falkland Islands

2.406

Maldives

3.382

French∗ Southern Territories

2.305

Seychelles

3.103

Maldives

2.238

Falkland Islands

2.520

Faroe Islands

1.848

French Southern Territories

2.305

Greenland

1.728

Faroe Islands

2.118

Mauritius

1.185

Greenland

2.038

Madagascar

1.114

Cook Isds

1.942

Senegal

0.993

Saint Helena

1.835

Macedonia∗∗

0.956

Tuvalu

1.260

Cote d’Ivoire

0.939

Mauritius

1.234

Morocco

0.887

Turks and Caicos

1.189

Mozambique

0.88

Western Sahara

1.180

Kazakhstan

0.827

Fiji

1.120

Ghana

0.817

Madagascar

1.114

Christmas Island

0.813

Russian Federation

1.071

Albania

0.805

Grenada

1.019

Iceland

0.775

Senegal

0.993

Moldova

0.762

Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of

0.956

Turkey

0.745

Cote d’Ivoire

0.939

∗ Islands

such as the French Southern territories can hardly be described as independent countries. ∗∗ It should be noted there are a few landlocked countries listed in this
table such as Macedonia, implying that freshwater and even farmed fish are included in the data.

TABLE 7 | Top 50 countries that exported fish to the EU, Japan and the United States in terms of value from 2010 to 2014.
Rank

Country

Top 25 values (million USD)

1

China

7,657

26

Namibia

331

2

Norway

7,024

27

Japan

324

3

Thailand

4,421

28

Australia

297

4

Canada

3,538

29

New Zealand

263

5

Chile

3,142

30

Honduras

254

6

Indonesia

3,076

31

Senegal

240

7

United States

2,508

32

Colombia

203

8

Ecuador

2,170

33

Spain

186

9

Viet Nam

2,121

34

Tunisia

178

10

Russia

2,052

35

Guatemala

176

11

Iceland

1,542

36

Nicaragua

175

12

Morocco

1,358

37

Sri Lanka

171

13

India

1,267

38

Taiwan

169

14

Peru

1,141

39

Cote d’Ivoire

165

15

South Korea

1,041

40

China, Hong Kong

164

16

Argentina

1,039

41

Ghana

162

17

Faroe Islands

769

42

Madagascar

161

18

Philippines

742

43

United Kingdom

157

19

Mexico

735

44

Panama

153

20

Greenland

531

45

Falkland Islands

152

21

Bangladesh

449

46

Brazil

150

22

Mauritius

358

47

Myanmar

133

23

Mauritania

342

48

Papua New Guinea

127

24

Seychelles

342

49

Fiji

123

25

South Africa

335

50

Netherlands

115

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

Rank

6

Country

Top 26–50 values (million USD)

February 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 34

Sumaila

Carding Systems as IUU Deterrents

issued a red card, would not be as severe as for the 25% of
countries that export only to the EU. This is because unlike
the latter countries, the former would be able to relatively
quickly redirect their exports to Japan and/or the United States.
However, with the United States and Japan also instituting
similar carding systems to that of the EU, all the top 20
exporting countries to each of these countries will be captured
in the red card web limiting their ability to switch to an
alternative market.

can be attributed completely to fish as some include other
things such as meat and marine mammals. However, the bulk
of the items will be fish-related items. Also, the codes would
also capture freshwater fish caught in rivers and lakes and not
only the ocean, here, too the bulk of the coverage is almost
surely ocean fish.
The World Bank (2016) [formally known as International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development] and UN Statistics
(2016) were the sources for GDP data. In the few cases where
GDP values were not available in these databases, other sources
(e.g., national statistics) were used.

Fish Export Dependency Indicators
Fish2Fish Ratio

Computing Carding Economic Risk
Indices (C-ERI)

I present in Table 3 the top Fish2Fish ratio fish and fish
products (from now on “fish”) exporting countries to the EU
only and to the EU, the United States and Japan combined.
We see from the table (Columns 1 and 4) that most of the
top 20 Fish2Fish exporting countries to the EU are small
developing countries, 10 of which are African. Three of the top
20 exporting countries (French Southern Territories; Macedonia
and Cote d’Ivoire) send over 90% of their fish exports to the
EU; nine of these countries export over 80% while all twenty
fish exporting countries send 70% or more of their exports
to the EU.
When all three leading fish importing countries implement a
carding system, we see that 6 (not 3 as in the case of an EU only
carding system) of the top 20 countries export over 90% of their
fish to the 3 countries while all the remaining 14 countries export
over 80% of their fish to these countries.
The high Fish2Fish ratios reported above indicate that the top
20 exporting countries to the EU are highly dependent on the EU
market for their fish.

Data described in Section “Fish Exports Data to the EU, the
United States and Japan” are used to, first, calculate the economic
risk index for fish exporting countries to the EU. Next, I do the
same for countries that export fish to the EU, the United States
and Japan combined. I then determine the top 50 countries
that export to the EU, Japan and the United States in terms
of value and assess how many of these countries are included
in the list of top 20 highest economic risk countries under a
red card scenario by the EU alone and by the three countries
combined. I do this for the top 10, 20, and 50 exporting
countries by value.

RESULTS
Fish Imports by the EU, the United States
and Japan
The EU, United States and Japan together were by far the largest
importers of fish worldwide between 2010 and 2014. On average,
I estimated that (Table 1):

Fish2Products Ratio
Table 4 reports the proportion of the annual value of exported fish
to the EU only and the EU, United States and Japan combined
relative to the value of all products exported to the world as
a whole (i.e., Exported fish to EU/All exported products to the
world) by the 20 exporting countries with the highest proportions
from 2010 to 2014, on average.
In the case of Fish2Products ratio too, we see that most
of the top 20 Fish2Products exporting countries are small
developing countries when the EU alone implements a carding
system, 11 of which are African while 4 are South, Central

1. The EU imported 5.2 million tons of fish amounting to
about USD 26 billion per year during this period;
2. The United States average annual imports was 1.2 million
tons with total value of USD 18 billion during the period;
3. Japan imported on average 1.2 million tons of fish valued at
USD 16 billion per year during this period.
We see from the above that, on average, fish imported by
the EU are less valuable per unit weight than those imported
by Japan and the United States. This could be explained by the
kind of species that each of these political entities import and
consume. For instance, while the consumption of less expensive
fish such as herring is common in some EU countries, shrimps,
and tunas are key species that are consumed in large quantities in
the United States and Japan.
From Table 2, we see that 5 out of the 20 top fish exporting
countries ship their fish to only the EU with the remainder
exporting to at least two of the three major importing countries.
This means that 75% of the top exporting countries will have
alternative markets in either the United States or Japan or both
because they already have a presence in these markets. This
implies that the economic risk to these countries, if they are
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TABLE 8 | The number of the top 10, 20, and 50 countries that export fish to the
EU, Japan and the United States included in the list of top 20 highest economic
risk countries under a red card scenario by the EU alone, and by the three
countries combined.
No. of countries on top 20 econ risk index of
Top X exporters
to EU, Japan and
United States

7

EU only

EU, Japan and United States

% Change

10

0

3

20

4

8

100

50

11

22

100
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American and Caribbean countries. For six of the countries,
fish export values to the EU constitute over 50% of their total
product exports to the EU. For 13 of these countries, fish
export values are over 10% of the value of all the products
they export to the EU. Furthermore, many of these countries
export relatively small quantities of fish to the EU (Table 4), with
Iceland exporting the highest in weight of ∼224 1000 tons to
the EU (Table 4).
The above numbers change dramatically when the EU,
United States and Japan implement a carding system. While no
country sends over 80% of the total products export to the EU,
three countries do so to the three importing countries combined.
Also, while 7 out of the 20 countries send less than 10% of the
products export to the EU, all the 20 exporting countries on the
list export more than 10% of their total products exports to the
EU, United States and Japan markets.

this table are either developed countries (e.g., Norway, Canada)
or large developing coastal countries (e.g., China, Indonesia).
The data in the above tables are used to determine how
many of the top 10, 20, and 50 countries that export to the EU
only, and to the EU, Japan and the United States combined are
included in the list of top 20 highest economic risk countries
under a red card scenario. The results obtained are presented
in Table 8.
We see from the table that when the EU is the only one issuing
red cards none of the top 10 fish exporting countries are under
economic risk while three countries (Canada, Chile, and Russia)
face economic risk under a scenario in which all three countries
issue red cards. Similarly, the number of economic risk countries
increases for the top 20 and 50 fish exporting countries to the
three political entities when all of them implement a carding
regulation. In fact, I find that the number of countries increases
by 100% in both cases (Table 8).

Fish2GDP Ratio
Observation

I present in Table 5 the proportion of the value of exported fish
to the EU relative to the GDP of the exporting country (i.e., value
of exported fish to EU/GDP) by the 20 exporting countries with
the highest proportions.
The pattern we see in the case of Fish2Fish and Fish2Product
continues here too, with the Fish2GDP ratio being higher when
all three leading fish importing countries institute a carding
system. For instance, while only 10 countries have a Fish2GDP
ratio of more than 2% when only the EU carding system is in
place, all 20 countries have a Fish2GDP ratio of greater than
2% when all three major importing political entities implement
a carding system.

IUU carding systems implemented by the EU, United States and
Japan would ensure that many more top fish exporting countries
are included in the carding system.

CONCLUSION
European Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 has been
a new policy instrument with the potential to contribute to the
global effort to deter people from engaging in illegal, unreported
and unregulated fishing if applied fairly and comprehensively on
major fish exporters to the EU. The analysis carried out in this
contribution shows that the regulation can motivate countries
to take action on IUU fishing. In fact, this happened in the
case of Thailand and Ghana, for example, where yellow cards
issued by the EU has motivated these countries to increase their
efforts in tackling IUU fishing in their waters. Another positive
contribution of this regulation is the change of expectation
and perception of IUU fishing that it may have instilled in
the fishing industry. It has also demonstrated to large fish
importing countries such as the United States and Japan one
possible way by which they could contribute to reducing IUU
fishing worldwide.
Having said the above, this study shows that the EU alone
putting in place and implementing this regulation may not be
enough to put a significant dent on IUU fishing worldwide. For
this to be more effective, more major fish importing countries
such as the United States, Japan, China, etc. would have to
institute similar regulations. There are several reasons for this.
First, data analysis shows that 11 (including Norway, China,
Canada, Iceland, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Peru) of the
top 20 fish exporting countries to the EU, China and Japan,
export to all three countries. Also, more than six countries
(e.g., Ecuador, Morocco, Philippines, and South Korea) in this
category export to two of these countries. This means that
it would be quite possible for these exporting countries to
redirect the fish they sell to the EU to Japan and/or the
United States when faced with a red card from the EU.

Observation
All three economic dependency ratios (Fish2Fish, Fish2Products,
Fish2GDP) increase significantly when all three top importing
fish countries institute IUU carding systems compared to when
only the EU does.

Effect of EU, United States and Japan
Implementing an IUU Carding System
I report in Table 6 below the top 20 countries with the highest
economic risk indices under a red carding scenario by the EU
only, and by the EU, United States and Japan combined.
We see from Table 6 that the economic risk when all
three countries implement a carding system is higher than
when only the EU implements it. The implication is that
all three major fish importing countries implementing
a carding system would increase the economic risks to
fish exporting countries to these three major markets
across the board.

Observation
Increased economic dependency with the three top fish
exporting countries instituting IUU carding systems would
lead to higher economic risk facing the top fish exporters to
these countries.
Table 7 reports the top 50 exporting countries to the EU, Japan
and the United States, we see that most of the countries listed in
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Second, we see that the countries that would face the highest
economic risk of being red carded by only the EU are small
developing countries that export relatively small quantities of
fish to the EU countries, making action by only the EU less
weighty. Finally, with the three countries all implementing a red
carding system, the economic risk to leading exporters increases
thereby improving the effectiveness of red carding as a deterrent
to IUU fishing.
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